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EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS: IS COMPLETE
FORFEITURE OF NON-VESTED STOCK OPTIONS
FAIR AND EQUITABLE WHEN AN EMPLOYEE IS
INVOLUNTARILY TERMINATED WITHOUT CAUSE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Ann is a research scientist employed by a small public biotech-
nology company. Yesterday, she learned that as a result of a larger
than anticipated year-end earnings loss, the company is planning to
cut next year's research budget by twenty-five percent. To achieve
the needed budget cut, the company decided to reduce its work force
by terminating two research programs. Ann was informed that her
research project is one of the two being dropped; consequently, she
will lose her job. Although Ann has made substantial contributions
to the company in terms of her research, the company has deter-
mined that the market potential of the product area she has been
researching is limited. Her effective date of termination is January
31, 1993.
On March 1, 1991, Ann received an incentive stock option
grant of 10,000 shares from the company. Under the terms of the
grant,1 Ann's stock options were subject to a three year vesting
schedule.' According to this schedule, fifty percent of the options
(5,000 shares) vest March 1, 1993 and the remaining fifty percent
(5,000 shares) vest March 1, 1994.' The grant states that if Ann's
employment is terminated for any reason, she will forfeit any options
1. The "grant" is the stock option agreement which sets forth the terms of the plan,
including the number of options granted, the exercise price, and the vesting schedule. See Her-
bert Kraus, Stock Options, in 2 START-UP COMPANIES: PLANNING, FINANCING AND OPER-
ATING THE SUCCFSSFUL BUSINESS § 13.08 (Richard D. Harroch ed., 1991); Liposome Tech-
nology, Inc., 1987 Employee Stock Option Plan, Incentive Stock Option Agreement
[hereinafter LTI Stock Option Plan] (on file with SANTA CI.ARA LAW REVIEW).
2. As an incentive to long term employment, stock option plans typically have vesting
restrictions. Stock option vesting schedules are usually tied to length of employment. John W.
Bouymaster & Daniel W. Frank, Employee Benefit Plans, in 2 START-UP COMPANIES:
PLANNING, FINANCING, AND OPERATING THE SUCCESSFUL BUSINESS § 14.02[1] (Richard D.
Harroch ed., 1991). See infra note 36.
3. Vested is defined as "having the character or given the rights of absolute ownership;
not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition precedent." Bl.ACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1563 (6th ed. 1990).
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not yet vested. 4 Since Ann's effective termination date is January 31,
1993, under the vesting terms of the stock option grant, she forfeits
the entire grant. The exercise price of Ann's stock options is $5.00
per share, and the closing stock market price for the company's stock
was $15.00 per share on December 31, 1992. The effect is that Ann
loses a potential profit of $50,000 by not being able to exercise her
stock options and sell the shares on the public market at the current
price.'
In the foregoing hypothetical, unless Ann had a provision in her
stock option grant specifically providing for pro rata' or accelerated7
vesting of her stock options in the event of an involuntary termina-
tion, her option grant is subject to full forfeiture, because only vested
options, of which she has none, are exercisable. This comment ad-
dresses the issue of whether it is fair and equitable for an employee,
such as Ann, to entirely forfeit a stock option grant when that em-
ployee is involuntarily terminated, without cause,8 just prior to a
stock option vesting date.
First, this comment describes stock options and why stock op-
tion grants are commonly used,9 explores how stock options are
characterized in relationship to other employee benefit plans,"0 com-
pares vesting of stock options and vacation pay in terms of what hap-
pens upon employment termination,"1 and examines how the statu-
tory and case law deals with equity problems raised by the forfeiture
4. Only vested options are fully owned by the employee and not subject to repurchase
by the company; they can be exercised (bought from the company) for a stated exercise price.
The exercise price is set forth in the stock option agreement and is based on the fair market
value of the stock at the time of grant. See I.R.C. § 422(b)(4) (1992); Kraus, supra note 1,
§ 13.08.
5. The potential profit is the difference between the exercise price and the market
price, times the number of shares exercised and sold. ($15 - $5 = $10; $10 x 5,000 shares
$50,000).
6. "To divide, share, or distribute proportionately." BI.ACK's LAw DIcTrIONARY 1220
(6th ed. 1990). For example, if Ann had worked II months out of the 12 necessary for vesting,
she would receive eleven-twelfths of the shares.
7. In accelerated vesting, any non-vested options would fully vest as of the termination
date. For example, if Ann worked 11 months out of the 12 required for vesting, the full 12
month amount would vest for the year she was terminated.
8. "Without cause" means that the employee was laid off because of company eco-
nomic or business factors rather than individual performance based factors. In general, "with-
out cause" implies that the employee had no control over the reasons for her termination;
"with cause" means that the employee was directly responsible (through her own actions) for
the termination.
9. See infra part II.A.
10. See infra part II.B.
11. See infra parts II.C.1-2.
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of non-vested vacation pay benefits. 12
Next, the comment discusses the inequities of stock option for-
feiture provisions,13 explores inconsistencies in the case law regard-
ing forfeiture, 4 and analyzes the chances for recovery by a plaintiff
such as Ann." The recovery analysis section specifically discusses
bad faith termination, 6 stock options and whether they are deferred
compensation or compensation for future services,' 7 and equitable
theories of recovery.1
Finally, this comment proposes that a new provision of the Cal-
ifornia Labor Code be enacted to provide for pro rata vesting of
stock options when an employee is involuntarily terminated, without
cause, before the vesting date of the employee's stock options. 9 Pro
rata vesting, rather than accelerated vesting, is proposed as a solu-
tion, because pro rata vesting is fair to both the company and the
employee. As discussed later in this comment, accelerated vesting fa-
vors the employee, whereas forfeiture favors the company. Such a
labor code provision will provide certainty in the law and protect
employees from losing valuable, earned benefits when they are ter-
minated because of circumstances beyond their control.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Stock Options: What They Are and Why They Are Used
Stock options are defined as the right to buy a designated stock,
if the holder of the option so chooses, at any time within a specified
period at a determinable price.2" Stock options are generally divided
into two types, statutory and nonstatutory. 2" Incentive stock options
(ISOs) are statutory options designed to provide selected employees
with the opportunity to acquire stock in the employing company on
a favorable tax basis. 22 Nonstatutory stock options (so-called non-
qualified stock options) are also designed to provide certain employ-
ees with the opportunity to acquire stock in the employing company,
12. See infra parts II.D.1-2.
13. See infra part III.A.
14. See infra part IV.A.
15. See infra parts IV.B-D.
16. See infra part IV.B.
17. See infra part WV.C.
18. See infra parts IV.D.I-5.
19. See infra part V.
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1418 (6th ed. 1990).
21. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.0213].
22. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[3][a].
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but unlike incentive stock options, these options have no tax
benefits.2"
For either type of stock option, no income tax consequences en-
sue at the time the options are granted. 4 Non-qualified options are
taxed when the employee exercises the option. The employee recog-
nizes compensation income (ordinary income), measured by the dif-
ference between the exercise price and the fair market value of the
stock at the time of exercise.25 At that time, the corporation also re-
ceives a comparable compensation tax deduction.2" ISOs are taxed
somewhat differently.27 At the time of exercise, the employee recog-
nizes no compensation income.2 8 If, after exercise, the employee
holds the stock for over a year before selling, capital gains income is
recognized." If the stock is sold before the one year holding period
expires, the employee is taxed in the same manner as non-qualified
options."
Since capital gains are now taxed at virtually the same rate as
ordinary income," there are few real differences between these two
types of stock options. Nonetheless, statutory stock options or ISOs,
can still provide a benefit to the employee since, as a general rule, no
tax is imposed at the time of exercise.32 In contrast, tax generally is
imposed at the time a nonstatutory option is exercised.13 Overall, the
compensation benefits of stock option plans can be substantial: stock
options do not use up the employer's or an employee's cash and no
compensation expense is incurred by the employer.34
Company stock option plans are used to attract and retain exec-
23. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[3][c].
24. Soule v. Retirement Income Plan, 723 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. If the employee does not immediately sell the stock after exercise, any future
gain or loss is measured from the exercise price.
29. Id. The necessary holding period for capital gains treatment is two years after the
option was granted and one year after it was exercised. I.R.C. § 422(a)(1) (1992); Kraus,
supra note 1, § 13.02[8].
30. Soule, 723 F. Supp. at 1142. The gain is taxed as ordinary income. See Kraus,
supra note 1, §13.0218].
31. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.01; Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[3]. The
maximum capital gains tax rate is 28% and the maximum tax rate on ordinary income is 31%.
I.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(e), (h) (1992). However, since a 31% rate is applied only at the highest in-
come levels, for most taxpayers, the capital gains tax rate would be identical to the ordinary
income tax rate of 28%.
32. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[3).
33. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[3].
34. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.01.
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utive, key, or qualified personnel, and such options, when granted,
are considered a form of compensation. 35 The primary objective of a
stock option plan is to motivate an employee to work for the long-
term success of the company by providing equity ownership in the
company.3 In some areas of the country, notably California's Silicon
Valley, stock options are considered to be essential elements of a
start-up company's compensation package.37 Stock option plans are
particularly attractive to start-up companies, because they provide a
well recognized means of compensating employees without depleting
valuable cash reserves, they offer upside potential to employees with-
out downside risk (until exercise), and they motivate employees to
work harder toward the success of the company.3"
B. Characterization of Stock Options: Deferred Compensation or
Compensation for Future Services?
Characterizing stock options as either deferred compensation or
compensation for future services is an important exercise in evaluat-
ing whether pro rata vesting is justified in cases of involuntary ter-
mination. Deferred compensation vests as it is earned and is analo-
gous to a condition subsequent situation,3 9 whereas a future services
requirement sets up a condition precedent situation.4" Nonperform-
ance of a condition subsequent does not prevent a right from vest-
ing.41 In contrast, a condition precedent could prevent vesting,4 since
35. In re Marriage of Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680 (Ct. App. 1984).
36. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.0211]. Since the object of a stock option
plan is to entice the employee to remain with the company on a long-term basis, such plans
typically have an initial period of employment required for any vesting (typically one year to
several years). Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02[2). For example, a typical plan
may provide for a three, four, or five year vesting schedule (i.e., the options vest one-third on
the second anniversary of employment and two-thirds over the next two years; or vest 25% on
the second anniversary, then 25% each year thereafter for the next three years; or vest 20% on
the second anniversary, then 20% each year thereafter for the next four years). Kraus, supra
note 1, § 13.08; see also LTI Stock Option Plan, supra note 1.
37. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02111. See infra note 125 and accompany-
ing text.
38. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02131.
39. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 125-27 (Cal. 1982).
40. It would not be unreasonable to interpret eligibility requirements as a condition
precedent before vacation pay vests, if the sole purpose of vacation pay were to encourage
employees to stay in the position for a specified time period. Id. at 127. If, however, vacation
pay is not viewed as an inducement for future services, but rather is judged to be compensation
for past services, there is no longer a justification for requiring employees to remain for the
entire year. Id.
41. Id. at 126.
42. Id.
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the employment conditions would need to be met before the options
are vested.
In In re Marriage of Hug,4 a California appellate court indi-
cated that stock options may be classified as compensation for past,
present, or future services."" Characterizing stock options as compen-
sation for future services relies on the general rule that option agree-
ments must ordinarily be supported by consideration and that, in
practice, the consideration will usually be supplied in the form of
continued services.45 However, for many small companies without
substantial cash resources, stock options may provide a means of at-
tracting employees willing to render services for modest compensa-
tion in return for future rewards on a potentially tax-favored basis."'
Although a company may wish to provide an incentive for future'
services in such a situation, the primary goal appears to be deferring
compensation for present services."7 Similarly, in Bertero v. Na-
tional General Corp.,'8 the court found that the stock options at
issue were intended to be additional compensation to the plaintiff.
The court determined that the stock options served not only as an
added reward for valuable services to be rendered, but also they en-
couraged increased current effort on the part of the employee to
achieve added profit for the corporation."9
As a basis of comparison, vacation pay is considered a form of
deferred compensation.5" In this respect, vacation pay is similar to
pension benefits51 or bonus pay,52 other forms of deferred compensa-
tion."3 The question of whether stock options should be treated as
deferred compensation or compensation for future services will be
43. 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
44. Id. at 679.
45. Id. at 680.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 62 Cal. Rptr. 714 (Ct. App. 1967).
49. Id. at 723.
50. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 125 (Cal. 1982).
51. Although an employee does not earn the right to a full pension until he or she has
completed the prescribed period of service, some pension rights actually have been earned as
soon as substantial services for the employer have been performed. Kern v. City of Long
Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 803 (Cal. 1947). In a sense, the employee is not fully compensated upon
receiving his or her salary payment because, in addition, certain pension benefits have also
been earned, and the payment of these benefits is deferred to a future date. Id.
52. A federal district court found the plaintiff entitled to an accrued bonus, because it
considered the bonus compensation for services already performed. Harden v. Warner Amex
Cable Communications, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1080, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
53. Suastez, 647 P.2d at 125.
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further examined in a later section of this comment. 4
C. Vesting of Employee Benefit Rights
1. Stock Options
To be a valid contract, a stock option plan must contain consid-
eration which passes to the corporation, and which can take one of
many forms, including the retention of services of a valued employee,
or the gaining of services from a new employee.55 Stock option plans
have been found invalid when the stock options were exercisable
upon grant, without an employment contract or other consideration
to insure that the corporation would receive the benefits contem-
plated.5" Therefore, to encourage the employee to continue working
for the success of the company and to insure that the employer re-
ceives the service benefits bargained for, vesting restrictions are com-
monly imposed in stock option grants. 57 It is well-settled law that
where the optionee is required to remain employed by the corpora-
tion for an extended period of time, no legal attack may be success-
fully made upon the validity of such options.58
The vesting schedule is controlled by the stock option grant,59
and stock option vesting typically occurs over a period of several
years.60 The grant may provide for forfeiture of non-vested options if
the employee's employment terminates for any reason, or it may pro-
54. See infra part IV.C.
55. Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960). Delaware case law is cited as applicable
law, because many companies located in California are incorporated in Delaware. The validity
of issuance of stock options to employees of a Delaware corporation is governed by Delaware
corporation law. Elster v. American Airlines, 100 A.2d 219 (Del. Ch. 1953).
56. Frankel v. Donovan, 120 A.2d 311 (Del. Ch. 1956); Kerbs v. California E. Air-
ways, 91 A.2d 62 (Del. 1952). In contrast, stock options plans have also been held valid even
though the plan did not require the optionee to make any agreement to remain in the com-
pany's employ and the option granted could be exercised at any time after the date of the
grant. Stemerman v. Ackerman, 184 A.2d 28, 30 (Del. Ch. 1962) (citing Beard v. Elster, 160
A.2d 731 (Del. 1960)). However, such option plans were allowed, because the board of direc-
tors determined that the plan would result in the retention of the services of the valued em-
ployees, and the court did not want to second guess the independent business judgment of the
board. Id. at 31. Although such factors may not be determined by the court to be legal consid-
eration, there is no doubt that they constitute the real consideration sought by the corporation
in return for such options. Id. at 32 (citing Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch.
1952)). Thus, as long as the court finds that the company is in some way assured it will
receive what it expects from the employee, stock options grants are valid both with and without
vesting schedules.
57. See supra note 36.
58. Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343 (Del. 1964).
59. See supra note 1.
60. See supra note 36.
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vide for pro rata or accelerated vesting under certain circumstances.61
However, the grant usually will not provide for early vesting in the
event of a voluntary termination or an involuntary termination with
cause and, subsequently, any non-vested options are forfeited in such
circumstances.62
General contract principles provide that by accepting the stock
option grant, the employee agrees to be bound by the terms of the
grant.63 In Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,64 a federal district
court stated, "[a]lthough a broad forfeiture clause in an employment
or options contract may work a harsh result, a court must act only
upon the language of the written contract." 5 This holding was
reached even though the employee's termination was induced by hu-
miliation and harassment calculated to force his resignation.66
In contrast, when an employee was terminated through bad
faith on the part of the employer, the employee was allowed to re-
cover.6" In Gaines v. Monroe Calculating Machine Co., 68 a New
Jersey appellate court held that a discharge without cause prior to
the expiration of a five year vesting period, especially a discharge
made in bad faith for the purpose of destroying the employee's right
to the option, did not permit termination of the option.69 Thus,
where an employee is discharged without just cause and for the pur-
pose of depriving the employee of the right to exercise his stock
purchase option, the employer is liable for damages."0 Similarly, in
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.," recovery was allowed for pension bene-
fits where there was bad faith on the part of the employer in termi-
61. See Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.08. Circumstances triggering accelerated vesting may
be that the company is acquired or that the employee is involuntarily terminated without
cause. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.08.
62. See Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.08.
63. This principle was upheld in a Minnesota Supreme Court case. Knudsen v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1990). The Knudsen court held that where an
employee enters into a stock option agreement that is granted on certain terms and conditions,
he or she is bound by those conditions. Id. at 133. However, the court explained that this
holding does not mean it would not recognize situations in which a broad termination provi-
sion in a stock option contract would be subject to a good faith finding of cause before the stock
rights could be denied. Id.
64. 331 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
65. Id. at 427.
66. Id. at 428.
67. Gaines v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 188 A.2d 179, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1963).
68. Id. at 179.
69. Id. at 185.
70. Haag v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 324 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir. 1963).
71. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
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nating employment.72
In cases where the terms of the contract may be ambiguous, a
court will consider the circumstances of the termination. :" In Langer
v. Iowa Beef Packers, Inc.,"4 a federal court of appeals permitted the
plaintiff to exercise his stock options after the defendant sold its
plant to another corporation and assigned the plaintiff's employment
contract to that corporation, even though the option contract stated
that the options would terminate in the event the optionee ceased to
be an employee of the defendant.75 The court noted that the sale of
the defendant's business was an extraordinary contingency which
was not anticipated by the parties and not contemplated in the op-
tion contract.7" Since the contract was silent as to such an event, the
court construed the ambiguity in the optionee's favor and permitted
recovery.
77
2. Vacation Pay
The vesting of vacation pay is controlled by statute in Califor-
nia.7" Section 227.3 of the California Labor Code provides that
"whenever a contract of employment or employer policy provides for
paid vacation, and an employee is terminated without having taken
off his vested vacation time, all vested vacation shall be paid to him
72. A federal district court cited Lucas as a recent example where discharged employees
were allowed to recover forfeited pension plan rights on the basis of quasi-contract, even
though they were precluded from recovering under the terms of the contract itself:
[A] class action was brought on behalf of 65 former employees against their
former employer to recover their forfeited interest in the defendant's non-con-
tributory pension plan. Under the terms of the plan, the employees were only
entitled to pension benefits if they continued in employment until retirement. In
Lucas, the employer engaged in a mass firing of the plaintiffs and thus pre-
cluded them from fulfilling this condition. Nonetheless, the court permitted
quasi-contractual recovery on the theory that the employer had unjustly bene-
fited from the plaintiffs forfeiture in the pension fund.
Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (citing Lucas v.
Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967)).
In addition, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") makes it
unlawful for an employer to discharge a participant in a benefit plan "for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan." Titsch v. Reliance Group, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 983, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1982)). Thus, an employee discharged before his or her retirement
rights vest may sue to redress a violation of § 1140. Id.
73. Fredericks, 331 F. Supp. at 423.
74. 420 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1970).
75. Id. at 367-69.
76. Id. at 369.
77. Id.
78. CAl.. LAB. CoDE. § 227.3 (Deering 1992).
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as wages at his final rate in accordance with such contract of em-
ployment or employer policy."79 As interpreted by the California Su-
preme Court in Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 80 vacation "vests"
under section 227.3 as labor is rendered.8" The Suastez court held as
follows:
The right to a paid vacation, when offered in an employer's
policy or contract of employment, constitutes deferred wages for
services rendered. Case law from this state and others, as well
as principles of equity and justice, compel the conclusion that a
proportionate right to a paid vacation vests as the labor is ren-
dered. Once vested, the right is protected from forfeiture by sec-
tion 227.3. On termination of employment, therefore, the state
requires that an employee be paid in wages for a pro rata share
of his vacation pay. 82
Thus, in California, as vacation pay is accrued and earned, it vests,
and once vacation pay is vested, the vested right is protected from
forfeiture.83 Other types of benefit plans also may vest prior to
reaching a specified date84 or accrue as services are rendered and
thus be entitled to pro rata vesting.85
D. Is Recovery Possible When Vesting Schedules are Imposed?
Before California Labor Code section 227.3 was enacted, Cali-
fornia courts applied principles of equity and fairness to allow laid-
off employees to recover pro rata vacation benefits in certain circum-
stances.8" The theories and relevant cases are discussed below. 87 Eq-
79. Id.
80. 647 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1982).
81. Id. at 128.
82. Id.(emphasis added).
83. Other jurisdictions have also held that employees have a vested right to a pro rata
share of vacation pay because the right vests as services are rendered. Amalgamated Butcher
Workmen Local Union No. 641 v. Capital Packing Co., 413 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1969); Tex-
tile Workers Union of America v. Paris Fabric Mills, Inc., 92 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1952).
84. The right to pension benefits vests upon accepting employment even though the
right to immediate payment may not mature until certain conditions are satisfied. Suastez v.
Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 125 (Cal. 1982) (citing Miller v. State, 557 P.2d 970,
974 (Cal. 1977)).
85. A federal district court considering the case of a forfeited bonus stated that "if em-
ployment is terminated by the act of the employer through no fault of the employee, the em-
ployee should be entitled to a proportionate share of the bonus, according to the time served,
even though there was no time fixed for the duration of the employment, and it could, there-
fore, be terminated at will." Harden v. Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 1080, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (quoting Annotation, 28 A.L.R. 346 (1924)).
86. Suastez, 647 P.2d at 127.
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uitable principles have also been used to provide recovery in pension
benefit vesting cases. 88
1. Frustration of Purpose
The California Supreme Court, in Posner v. Grunwald-Marx,
Inc.,89 recognized that the "frustration of purpose" doctrine can af-
ford relief in recovering pro rata vacation benefits.90 The Posner
court stated that if the purpose of requiring employment on a certain
date was to induce employees to remain employed, it may reasonably
be argued that the purpose of the contingency was frustrated by the
closing of the plant and that the employees should be excused from
performance of the condition precedent.91
2. Substantial Performance
California courts have also allowed recovery for vacation pay if
the employee has substantially performed, despite the fact that con-
tract eligibility requirements were not met.92 In Division of Labor
Law Enforcement, Department of Industrial Relations v. Ryan
Aeronautical Co.," substantial performance was found and vacation
pay recovered where an employee was discharged through no fault of
his own, with only five more working days left to complete his re-
quired year of employment.94 However, substantial performance was
not found in Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Department of
Industrial Relations v. Mayfair Markets,95 where an employee was
87. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
88. Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967). See supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
89. 363 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1961).
90. Id. at 324-25. However, the frustration of purpose doctrine has not been discussed
by a court in a stock option context.
91. Id.
92. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 127 (Cal. 1982). A substantial per-
formance theory has also been used to recover bonus pay:
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant to serve for a period of one year.
He was to receive a bonus if he remained in the employment for the entire year.
After serving all but a few weeks of the required term of employment his ser-
vices terminated under circumstances held to constitute a discharge without
cause. The plaintiff was permitted to recover the bonus.
Haag v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 324 F.2d 205, 208-09 (7th Cir. 1963) (citing Watts v.
Geisel, 194 N.E. 502 (Ind. App. 1935)). However, substantial performance has not been ap-
plied by courts in a stock option context.
93. 236 P.2d 236 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
94. Id. at 237-38.
95. 227 P.2d 463 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
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terminated because the business was sold; he had been employed
only ten months and was entitled to vacation pay after twelve
months of employment. 6 What is surprising about the two cases
mentioned above is that they were decided by the same court within
several months of one another. 7 Consequently, it is not clear how
close in time the employee must be to the vesting date before achiev-
ing substantial performance status.
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Inequities in Stock Option Vesting Upon Termination
As suggested by the hypothetical situation described above," in-
equity and unfairness in stock option vesting may result when em-
ployees are involuntarily terminated without cause. This problem is
particularly disturbing in the case of an unsophisticated employee
who, without the advice of a lawyer, may not foresee the potential
forfeiture problems associated with the vesting/termination provi-
sions of a stock option grant before signing it. Furthermore, even if
the employee is sophisticated about such contract matters, stock op-
tion grants may not be open to negotiation. Typically, the employee
either accepts the grant or forgoes the right to be granted any stock
options. The terms of the grant are drafted by the company and its
lawyers, and once ISO plans are in place, it can be difficult for an
employee to negotiate or alter the terms." Thus, if the grant does
96. Id.
97. Both cases were heard by the Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Diego
County, California. Mayfair Markets was decided Feb. 14, 1951 and Ryan Aeronautical Co.
was decided Sept. 28, 1951.
98. See supra part I.
99. This assertion is based on the fact that ISO plans are controlled by statute. If an
employee stock option plan is to achieve the special tax treatment afforded an ISO, it must
satisfy several conditions imposed by federal tax law: 1) the options must be granted pursuant
to a stock option plan and may not be granted more than 10 years after the plan was adopted
by the employer; 2) the plan under which the ISO is granted must have been approved by the
company's shareholders within 12 months of its adoption by the board of directors; 3) the ISO
must provide that it cannot be exercised more than 10 years after the date it was granted; 4)
the options holder must have remained in the continuous employ of the company or its subsidi-
aries from the date the ISO was granted until not more than three months before the date on
which it is exercised; 5) an ISO must be non-transferable; 6) the exercise price of an ISO must
not be less than the fair market value of the stock subject to the options at the time the options
are granted; 7) the amount of ISOs that may be exercised by an employee must be less than
the dollar quantity limits imposed by the IRS; and 8) the shares purchased must be held at
least two years after the option was granted and at least one year after it was exercised for
capital gains treatment. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.08. Because the ISO plan requires stock-
holder and board approval, once a plan is in place, it can only be amended with the necessary
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not provide for accelerated or pro rata vesting upon termination, an
employee could forfeit an entire stock option grant just before the
options vest if he or she is terminated due to an unexpected layoff.
The existing case law which discusses the vesting of stock op-
tions and other employee benefits at termination is inconsistent.
Some courts provide equitable remedies under certain circum-
stances;1"" however, most courts look to the language of the contract,
particularly in stock option disputes."0 Moreover, not only are
courts inconsistent in how they apply equitable remedies among the
different types of employee benefits (i.e., stock options, pensions, va-
cation pay, and bonus pay), but also the remedies vary within a spe-
cific type of employee benefit.'02 Since stock options are granted by
contract, they are often treated differently than vacation and bonus
pay upon termination, although all are arguably awarded to employ-
ees for similar purposes.
The problem presented in this comment is whether it is fair and
equitable for an employee to forfeit non-vested stock options upon an
involuntary, without cause termination. The California legislature
dealt with a similar problem when it enacted section 227.3 of the
Labor Code to mandate pro rata vesting of vacation pay upon termi-
nation.' 0 3 Thus, the question is whether the vesting schedule set
forth in a stock option grant should be pro rated (like vacation pay)
in cases where the optionee (the employee) has been involuntarily
terminated, without cause, from the company before the vesting date
of the options. The answer to this question will affect the way termi-
nation clauses are drafted and enforced in stock option plans.
B. Relevance of Issue to Legal Community
A clear solution to this problem would assist corporate, em-
ployee benefit, and executive compensation lawyers in drafting stock
option plans and in advising companies which are planning a down-
sizing, reduction in force, or layoff. This issue is particularly critical
for practitioners who counsel start-up, high technology companies,
since these companies commonly grant incentive stock options to key
approvals. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.08.
100. See Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Posner v. Grun-
wald-Marx, Inc., 363 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1961); Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Dep't of
Indus. Relations v. Ryan Aeronautical Co., 236 P.2d 236 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
101. See Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific. Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Knudsen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1990).
102. See Fredericks, 331 F. Supp. at 425-28.
103. CAl.. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (Deering 1992).
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employees.1°4 Such companies may have been adversely affected by
the recent economic recession, prompting them to consider a reduc-
tion in force to counteract declining profits. It is likely that many of
the employees who would be affected in such a termination plan are
key management, professional, and technical people with incentive
stock option grants from the company.
If a company, by terminating employment, forces its employees
to forfeit their stock options shortly before the stock option vesting
date, such a forfeiture may increase the potential for harsh feelings
towards the company and the likelihood of subsequent lawsuits.
However, since no California statutory law currently governs this
issue and California and federal case law in the area is limited,1 °6
the outcome of such a lawsuit is uncertain. Moreover, there is con-
flict within the existing case law regarding whether the grant (the
contract) controls or whether equitable principles should be applied
in the cases of without cause, involuntary termination.
IV. ANALYSIS
Returning again to the hypothetical situation of Ann, the bio-
technology research scientist who lost her job in a company downsiz-
ing and, as a result, forfeited her right to any stock options vesting
after her termination date,1"6 what right, if any, does Ann have to
either a remedy of specific performance to reinstate her options or
money damages for the market value of the options? In addition,
what chances for recovery does the case law offer to Ann? The re-
mainder of this comment will explore and analyze the issues raised
by these questions.
A. Inconsistent Case Law
Since courts commonly will look to the contract (the stock op-
tion grant or agreement) rather than fashion an equitable remedy, 10 7
Ann's chances for recovery under the existing case law are probably
slim, unless she can show bad faith termination on the part of her
employer. Ann's grant specifically stated that non-vested options will
104. See infra note 128.
105. It is possible that this issue has not yet been litigated because many start-up high
technology companies may not have experienced the need for downsizing until the last several
years.
106. See supra part I.
107. See Fredericks v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 331 F. Supp. 422, 428 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
Knudsen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 450 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1990).
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be forfeited if she is terminated for any reason. Therefore, if a court
strictly follows the contractual language, Ann's options would be
subject to forfeiture. Nonetheless, some courts have applied the prin-
ciples of equity and fairness to allow vacation pay recovery to laid-
off employees under certain circumstances.'0 8
Although the case law is inconsistent in applying equitable rem-
edies, and such remedies have not generally been applied in stock
option cases, if an analogy can be made from vacation pay to stock
options, there is a chance that Ann could recover her forfeited stock
options on a theory of substantial performance'0 9 or frustration of
purpose."0 This analogy is discussed in a later section of this com-
ment."' In addition, there may be other equitable theories that could
entitle Ann to recovery; these theories also will be discussed.
B. Employer's Bad Faith
Ann's best chance of success in reinstating her forfeited options
is to demonstrate a bad faith termination on the part of the company,
since pro rata vesting is allowed when a company terminates em-
ployment in bad faith." 2 She would have to prove that the company
either deliberately terminated her employment to deprive her of the
stock options," 3 or be able to prove wrongful termination by some
other means. However, if there is no evidence in writing, the com-
pany's intention to deprive Ann of the options or to discriminate
against her may be very difficult to prove, particularly where there
has been a company-wide general layoff for economic reasons.
Therefore, if bad faith on the part of her employer cannot be shown,
Ann's alternatives are limited. Based on the inconsistency in the case
law, the chances of a successful recovery are unclear.
108. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 127 (Cal. 1982).
109. Cf id. at 127 (applying a substantial performance theory to allow recovery of vaca-
tion pay).
110. Cf id. at 127-28 (applying a frustration of purpose theory to allow recovery of
vacation pay).
111. See infra part IV.C.
112. See Gaines v. Monroe Calculating Mach. Co., 188 A.2d 179 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1963); cf Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967) (applying pro
rata vesting to pension benefits).
113. In Gaines, a discharge made in bad faith to destroy the employee's stock options
was found to be a sufficient cause of action, even though the option agreement stated that the
employer could repurchase the option if employment terminated "voluntarily or involuntarily"
within five years. Gaines, 188 A.2d at 179.
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C. Deferred Compensation: Stock Option / Vacation Pay Analogy
As discussed previously,114 an issue critical to determining
whether Ann can recover a pro rata amount of her stock options is
whether those options are considered a form of deferred compensa-
tion or compensation for future services. The California Supreme
Court has stated that vacation pay is deferred compensation.115 Ac-
cordingly, in attempting to make an analogy from vacation pay to
stock options, the purpose of the stock option grant must be
determined.
The controlling California case on the issue of whether stock
options are considered deferred compensation or compensation for
future services is a community property marital dissolution case, In
re Marriage of Hug."" The court in Hug held that because the pur-
poses underlying a stock option grant can differ, the facts of each
case must be considered in deciding whether stock options are com-
pensation for past, present, and/or future services.'1 7 Stock option
agreements ordinarily must be supported by consideration and, in
practice, consideration would usually be supplied by the employee in
the form of continued services.1 8 But the assertion that stock options
are earned exclusively by future services is weakened somewhat in
light of the flexibility and variety of option plans, as well as the
differences in the size and financial circumstances of the offering
company. 9 The Hug court declined to find that stock options are
earned exclusively by future services, even though most plans em-
phasize the incentive aspect of the options. 20 Instead, the court
found that the stock options at issue in the case were deferred
compensation."'
The Hug court reasoned that for the smaller company, the com-
pany without substantial cash resources, or the company in dis-
tressed circumstances, stock options may. provide a means of at-
tracting strong management talent willing to render its services for
modest current compensation in return for substantial future re-
wards on a tax-favored basis. 22 Thus, the primary goal of such
114. See supra notes 39-54 and accompanying text.
115. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 125 (Cal. 1982).
116. 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
117. Id. at 679.
118. Id. at 680.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 680-84.
121. Id. at 683.
122. Id. at 680.
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stock options is to defer compensation for present services."' 3 In Hug,
the plaintiff employee made a critical career move by giving up sub-
stantial benefits with his former company, IBM, to join his current
company, Amdahl. 2 ' The stock options appeared to be a key in-
ducement to the employee for making the move; hence, the court in-
ferred that the Amdahl stock options to some extent replaced the
benefits given up at IBM. 2 Consequently, the court found the facts
supported an implied finding that the stock options were earned
from the commencement of employment and concluded that the op-
tions were deferred compensation for present services.126
More information about the purpose of Ann's stock option
grant is required if Hug is applied to the aforementioned hypotheti-
cal. 2' For example, it is typical in small biotechnology companies,
especially when recruiting experienced executives and scientists from
large pharmaceutical companies, to offer stock options as a replace-
ment for the more substantial salary and benefits that the employee
often receives from the larger company. With limited resources in
the early years, the small company usually cannot compete with
larger, well-established companies in a recruiting capacity without
offering a stock option incentive plan to the desired employee. 26 If
the above described "replacement" occurred in Ann's case, she would
have a good argument that at least some portion, if not all, of the
stock options granted to her were deferred compensation rather than
compensation for future services.
The concept of stock options as compensation exclusively for fu-
ture services distinguishes stock option plans from other types of em-
ployee benefit plans. Vacation pay is considered deferred compensa-
tion which vests as it is earned. 29 Similarly, the rights to pension
benefits are deferred compensation and vest upon the acceptance of
employment, even though the right to immediate payment of a full
pension may not mature until certain conditions are satisfied.3 0
However, bonus plans may be more like stock options and could
123. Id.
124. Id. at 682.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 682-83.
127. See supra part 1.
128. The executive and high level technical personnel on the start-up team frequently
demand equity compensation in some form, and the start-up venture which is not prepared to
include equity participation in its compensation program may find it difficult to attract the
managerial and technical talent it needs. Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.01 (1990).
129. Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122, 125 (Cal. 1982).
130. Id. at 125 (citing Miller v. State, 557 P.2d 970, 974 (Cal. 1977)).
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probably be analyzed as either deferred compensation 13 1 or compen-
sation for future services, 32 depending on the purpose of the bonus
plan.
If stock options are considered exclusively deferred compensa-
tion, then there is sufficient legal precedent to support pro rata vest-
ing."3' As deferred compensation, the termination date does not af-
fect vesting, because the employee actually earns and vests a
percentage of the stock options each day worked." 4 In contrast, if
stock options are considered exclusively compensation for future ser-
vices, all future service must be completed before vesting occurs.
Consequently, if any portion of the stock options are compensation
for future services, additional legal theories are needed to provide
support for pro rata vesting of stock options upon involuntary
termination.
D. Compensation for Future Services: Equitable Theories for
Recovery
1. Substantial Performance
California courts have allowed recovery for vacation pay despite
the fact that the contract eligibility requirements were not met if the
employee had substantially performed his or her duties under the
contract."3 5 Substantial performance of a contract is shown when: 1)
a party has made an honest endeavor in good faith to perform his or
her part of the contract; 2) the results of that endeavor are beneficial
to the other party; and 3) such benefits are retained by the other
party."3 6 This doctrine is intended to prevent unjust enrichment.1 3 7 It
provides that where a contract is made for an agreed upon exchange
131. Harden v. Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1080, 1096
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
132. "Bonus and profit-sharing plans are a common device for rewarding incentive and
industry, retaining competent executives, and paying additional compensation in a manner
having favorable tax consequences." Hainline v. General Motors Corp., 444 F.2d 1250, 1253(6th Cir. 1971). Under the General Motors Plan in Hainine, bonus awards were made for
both past services and anticipated future employment. Id. Therefore, the beneficiary of a bonus
has a vested right to receive bonuses awarded as long as he or she remains employed. Id.
133. See Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 647 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1982); In re Marriage of
Hug, 201 Cal. Rptr. 676 (Ct. App. 1984).
134. See Suastez, 647 P.2d at 127. "If some share of vacation pay is earned daily, it
would be both inconsistent and inequitable to hold that employment on an arbitrary date is a
condition precedent to the vesting of the right to such pay." Id.
135. Id.
136. BLACK'S LAW DICTIIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
137. See infra part IV.D.2.
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of two performances, substantial performance, rather than literal
performance, is sufficient to entitle a party to recovery." 8
If stock options are considered compensation for future services,
the argument can be made that Ann has substantially performed her
end of the contract. As set forth in the stock option grant, fifty per-
cent of Ann's stock options were to vest after two years of service.
Based on her effective termination date, Ann fell short of the option
vesting date by only one month. Therefore, she has performed
twenty-three of the twenty-four months of service required by the
stock option grant.
In Division of Labor Law Enforcement, Department of Indus-
trial Relations v. Ryan Aeronautical Co.,"' substantial perform-
ance of the contract was found where an employee was discharged,
through no fault of his own, with only five more working days left to
complete the required year of employment that entitled him to vaca-
tion pay." 0 Conversely, in Division of Labor Law Enforcement, De-
partment of Industrial Relations v. Mayfair Markets,"' substantial
performance was not found and no vacation pay was awarded where
an employee was terminated because the business was sold. 142 The
employee had served ten of the twelve months required of him to
qualify for vacation pay."" Although these two cases were decided
by the same court,' 4 they do not provide clear guidelines for the
determination of substantial performance under an employment
contract.
In Ryan Aeronautical, the contract was ninety-eight percent
performed," 5 whereas in Mayfair Markets the contract was eighty-
three percent performed."' If a similar mathematical analysis is ap-
plied to Ann's case, her contract was ninety-six percent per-
formed."" Certainly, this level of completion could be factually con-
strued as substantial performance by a court. However, finding
substantial performance is a discretionary, fact-based decision that
138. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990).
139. 236 P.2d 236 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
140. Id.
141. 227 P.2d 463 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1951).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 464.
144. See supra note 97.
145. The percentage is obtained by dividing 51 weeks by 52 weeks. Ryan Aeronautical
Co., 236 P.2d at 237.
146. The percentage is obtained by dividing 10 months by 12 months. Mayfair Mkts.,
227 P.2d at 464-66.
147. The percentage is obtained by dividing 23 months by 24 months. See supra part 1.
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varies from court to court and case to case. In addition, there is no
indication that the California Superior Court which decided Ryan
Aeronautical and Mayfair Markets is representative of other courts.
Thus, in stock option vesting cases where the employee has nearly
reached the vesting date at the time of termination, a theory of sub-
stantial performance may provide recovery, but the results this
method produces are inconsistent at best. It would be unwise for a
terminated employee to depend on such an unreliable theory of re-
covery as his or her sole means of reinstating forfeited stock options.
2. Unjust Enrichment
The unjust enrichment doctrine is the general principle that one
party should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the ex-
pense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for
property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is
just and equitable.1" 8
In Lucas v. Seagrave Corp.,'" pension, benefits were awarded
to employees on an unjust enrichment theory.150 Sixty-five employees
were fired just before they reached the date entitling them to pension
benefits.' The employees contended their pension constituted a
form of compensation that they were induced to rely upon, that they
did rely to their detriment, and, consequently, that Seagrave was un-
justly enriched.' The court stated:
If a plaintiff who has breached a contract by failure to fulfill a
condition may recover for the benefit he confers, it would seem
equitable that employees, who failed to perform the condition of
the pension plan (continued employment until retirement) be-
cause of a group termination, should be entitled to an amount
equal to the benefit conferred on an employer. The employees'
failure to fulfill the conditions of the pension contract is not
willful, indeed, it is quite involuntary. The employer is not in a
position to argue that he is harmed by a non-performance of the
pension conditions, in fact, he causes it. Yet the employer re-
tains the full benefit of the employee's past service and secures
favorable tax treatment as well as the recapture of the accumu-
lated pension credits created by forfeitures.' 58
148. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1535-36 (6th ed. 1990).
149. 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967).
150. Id. See supra note 72.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 342.
153. Id. at 344-45.
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Thus, quasi-contractual recovery was held to be available to the
employees.'
In the case of a stock option forfeiture, the company has reaped
the benefits of an employee's hard work, creative ideas, and commit-
ment. In return, the employee loses valuable stock options and does
not get his or her part of the bargain. In the hypothetical, Ann spent
several years working for the company and made significant scientific
contributions. However, if the company was ultimately able to be-
come successful, Ann's contributions to the company would be
worthless in terms of her equity ownership in the company. More-
over, Ann may have taken a below-market salary in the hope that
her contributions to the company would be compensated through an
increased stock value."' But according to the terms of her option
grant, Ann will lose her right to company stock, even though the
company has had the benefit of her services. Thus, by allowing vest-
ing of Ann's stock options, the company makes restitution for the
benefits it has received from Ann's services.
3. Frustration of Purpose
Under the frustration of purpose doctrine, a party to a contract
will be relieved of the duty to perform when the objective purpose
for performance no longer ekists due to reasons beyond the party's
control. 5 In Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc. ,'5 the court stated
that "if the purpose of requiring employment on a certain date was
to induce employees to remain in employment, it may reasonably be
argued that the purpose of the contingency was frustrated by the
closing of the plant and the employees should be excused from per-
formance of the condition precedent."' 58
Although Posner is a vacation pay case, the doctrine of frustra-
tion of purpose is applicable to stock option vesting. Stock option
vesting schedules (restrictions) are typically used to encourage an
employee to continue working for the success of the company, 59 and
these vesting schedules require employment on a certain date. Hence,
if Ann intended to remain with the company until her vesting date
and the layoff was an event entirely out of Ann's control (i.e., not
based on poor performance), then the purpose of the stock option
154. Id. at 345.
155. See supra part IV.C.
156. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 670-71 (6th ed. 1990).
157. 363 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1961).
158. Id. at 324-25.
159. Bouymaster & Frank, supra note 2, § 14.02121.
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grant vesting schedule was frustrated by the layoff and Ann should
be excused from performance (i.e., remaining employed until her
vesting date).
4. Promissory Estoppel
Promissory estoppel arises when "a promise which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforce-
ment of the promise."16 If the company imposes a stock option vest-
ing schedule on an employee, expecting that the employee will make
a substantial effort to remain employed on the vesting date, and the
employee makes the effort by not voluntarily terminating his or her
employment, the elements of promissory estoppel are met. This the-
ory is especially fitting if the employee gave up other employment
offers so that he or she would be employed on the vesting date and
thus be eligible to exercise the stock options. If the employee relies to
his or her detriment (i.e., forgoes other employment opportunities)
on the promise of stock option vesting and then loses the options by a
means outside her control, the injustice of the forfeiture can only be
cured by allowing the employee to exercise the options.
A promissory estoppel theory has not been used by courts in
relationship to vacation pay or stock option vesting, possibly because
promissory estoppel is generally considered a substitute for consider-
ation and in most vacation pay and stock option cases, consideration
is not at issue. Nonetheless, like the unjust enrichment theory, it of-
fers equitable support for vesting an employee's stock options under
certain circumstances.
5. Adhesion Contract
An adhesion contract is a standardized contract that is essen-
tially offered on a "take it or leave it" basis; the party in the weaker
bargaining position has no realistic choice as to its terms."' Recog-
nizing that adhesion contracts are not the result of a traditionally
"bargained for" contract, the legal trend is to relieve the parties from
the onerous conditions imposed by such contracts.'
Stock option grants are often thought of only in relationship to
executive compensation; however, in many start-up high technology
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
161. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 40 (6th ed. 1990).
162. Id.
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companies, incentive stock options are given to many employees, es-
pecially those with key technical or scientific skills.' 63 Although it
can be argued that a high level executive may be sophisticated in
contractual matters and should be able to negotiate favorable grant
terms,164 many key technical or mid-level management employees
who receive stock option grants may be presented the stock option
grant in a "take it or leave it" manner. These employees may not
fully understand the forfeiture implications of the grant terms, or the
company may be unwilling to negotiate the terms.1 6 Thus, it is
questionable whether a grant that states, "non-vested stock options
are forfeited if employment is terminated for any reason" should be
enforced for non-executive level employees. In cases where termina-
tion is without cause and not under the employee's control, the harsh
effects of such a contract provision could be considered unconsciona-
ble for an unsophisticated employee.' 66
E. Equitable Remedies: Are They Adequate?
The various equitable theories described above offer legal ratio-
nales for vesting employee stock options when an employee is invol-
untarily terminated. However, these theories are, at best, risky pros-
pects for recovery through litigation. Although the theories are
legally sound, there is a good chance that a court would hold the
laid-off employee to the .terms of the stock option agreement. Conse-
quently, since courts have applied equitable remedies in employee
benefit cases inconsistently, a fair, consistent solution to the problem
is needed.
163. See supra note 128.
164. It could also be difficult for executives to negotiate stock option agreement terms.
See supra note 99.
165. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
166. A federal district court hearing a pension benefits case stated that:
[lit seems harsh to assert that employees assume knowingly the risk of all con-
tingencies which might prevent their recovery of benefits; as if the plan were a
negotiated contract agreed upon through arm's length bargaining. It hardly
seems equitable to apply the literal contract language, which may not have been
inserted to cover such a situation, to uncritically rule that employees bear the
risk of a group termination which may not have been contemplated by the con-
tract . . . . Such a literal enforcement of plan provisions may defeat rather than
foster plan purposes. This approach seems particularly unjustifiable where there
may be an indication of bad faith or where the doctrine of unjust enrichment is
invoked.
Lucas v. Seagrave Corp., 227 F. Supp. 338, 346 (D. Minn 1967).
19931
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
V. PROPOSAL
To ensure consistency in the law and to eliminate the basic un-
fairness of stock option forfeiture caused by involuntary termina-
tions, the California legislature should enact legislation similar to
Labor Code section 227.3.16 Such legislation would provide for vest-
ing of employee stock options in a pro rata manner upon without
cause, involuntary termination. The text of this new proposed provi-
sion would read as follows:
§ 227.4. Pro Rata Vesting of Employee Stock Option Plans
In any termination of employment by an employer for company
economic reasons rather than individual performance factors (a
"without cause" termination), any non-vested incentive stock
options or non-qualified stock options granted to the employee
will vest in a pro rata manner upon the effective date of
termination.
This new statutory provision is based on drawing an analogy
from vacation pay benefits to stock option plans and concludes that
the law relating to pro rata vacation pay benefits should also be ap-
plicable to stock option grants. Furthermore, the basic principles of
equity and fairness support such a provision, regardless of whether
stock options are considered deferred compensation or compensation
for future services.
A new Labor Code provision would prevent the inequitable sit-
uation described in the earlier hypothetical where Ann missed her
vesting date by one month and, consequently, forfeited stock options
of substantial value. Although Ann's situation in this comment is
purely hypothetical, her circumstances are a reality for some employ-
ees, particularly those working for start-up, high technology compa-
nies. The proposed law would provide for consistent stock option
vesting in layoff situations, set clear standards for companies drafting
the terms of stock option agreements, and protect employees from
forfeiting their valuable "sweat equity. 1 68
Pro rata vesting of stock options is the best means to achieve an
equitable result among involuntarily terminated employees. For ex-
167. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (Deering 1992).
168. Kraus' supra note 1, § 13.01. "Sweat equity" is the term commonly used to de-
scribe the equity in a start-up company that an employee earns through hard work and long
hours. The value of the stock is related to the success of the company, and the success of the
company depends on the significant contributions of the employees. "Such equity participation
can be particularly significant for employees of a new enterprise in which the potential growth
in value-if the company is successful-is likely to be much greater than in a mature com-
pany." Kraus, supra note 1, § 13.01.
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ample, if at the time of. the layoff, employee A is only one month
from vesting, but employee B is nine months from vesting, it would
be equitable to pro rate the portion of the vesting year so that em-
ployee A, who was closer to vesting, would vest a larger portion of
his or her shares. In contrast, if vesting were fully accelerated to the
next vesting date, both employees would receive complete vesting,
even though employee A had rendered more of the required service
time.
Pro rata vesting is also a more equitable method than acceler-
ated vesting from the company's perspective. This is because a pro-
portionate value of the employee's services has actually been received
by the company. Thus, employees who are not close to reaching their
vesting dates would vest only a proportionately small percentage of
their stock options. If the vesting were accelerated, the company
would be in the position of providing fully vested stock options to
those employees who had only worked a small portion of their vest-
ing year.
One important question has not yet been addressed in this com-
ment: whether vesting should be pro rated in cases of involuntary
termination "for cause" or voluntary termination by the employee.
Although vacation pay is vested under such circumstances, it could
be argued that the fundamental incentive and merit nature of stock
options requires forfeiture in cases of termination "for cause" and
voluntary termination. This proposal takes the position that inequi-
ties primarily exist in cases of without cause, involuntary termina-
tion and that the new statutory provision proposed should be limited
to these circumstances.
For the reasons outlined above, it is proposed that stock options
be vested in a pro rata manner upon involuntary, without cause ter-
mination. The codification of a pro rata stock option vesting provi-
sion solves the problem of forfeiture inequities and provides employ-
ees with a fair result upon termination. Consequently, employee
dissatisfaction should be minimized and potential litigation
prevented.
VI. CONCLUSION
Potential stock option vesting inequities exist when employees
are involuntarily terminated without cause. A new statutory provi-
sion, comparable to the vacation pay vesting provision of the Califor-
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nia Labor Code, 69 should be enacted by the legislature to provide
for pro rata vesting of employee stock options. Stock options would
then be treated like vacation pay in California; upon termination,
laid-off employees would receive a pro rata portion of their stock
options. Whether stock options are analyzed as deferred compensa-
tion or compensation for future services, there are strong arguments
that non-vested stock options should not be forfeited when employees
are terminated under circumstances beyond their control. Moreover,
equitable theories such as substantial performance, unjust enrich-
ment and frustration of purpose provide solid legal support for ad-
ding a pro rata stock option vesting provision to the California Labor
Code.
Although a stock option grant is a contract between the em-
ployee and the company, the principles of equity and fairness re-
quire limits on the extent of forfeiture provisions. These limitations
should be codified by the California legislature and provide for pro
rata stock option vesting in without cause, involuntary termination.
Such a code provision would be fair to both employees and their
employers, and result in consistency in the law.
Stock option plans provide employees with an opportunity to
benefit directly from the extraordinary appreciation of a start-up
company's stock, if the company is successful."' Thus, with pro rata
vesting, employees who lose their jobs in circumstances beyond their
control would not lose this valuable, hard-earned benefit. Appreci-
ated stock options are a direct result of an employee's substantial
personal investment in the company's value; this investment of the
employee's time, commitment, creativity, and hard work merits pro-
tection from the harsh vesting effects of arbitrarily timed company
layoffs.
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